This is largely aligned with where our elders have landed, after going deep on this as a group. Curious if you dove in on Malachi 2:16 and the use of the word, "hate" there? Interested to read what you come up with on "porneia" as well (that one is tough). Thanks for your work on this!
I have to a degree. But I probably won't spend as much time on the specific textual/linguistic problems of this passage in the near future. Maybe I'll write that down for an article down the road!
Thanks for an excellent post! I found this helpful too:
4. Divorce
Traditionally, there are two grounds for divorce: infidelity (Mt 5:32; 19:19) and desertion (1 Cor 7:15). One preliminary question is why the Matthew version, with its exemptive clause, is more liberal than the Markan version (10:11-12), on the one hand, but less liberal than the Pauline discussion, which “adds” a second ground?
Of course, any answer is bound to be somewhat conjectural, but the following may be suggested. It may be that Mark took adultery for granted, since that was assumed on all side (both Jewish & Greco-Roman) as a valid ground for divorce, whereas Matthew, in order to avoid future confusion, spells out the exception.
Or it may simply be that Matthew knew more than Mark. Mark had heard of the teaching of Jesus, but Matthew had heard the teaching of Jesus. Mark’s citation is accurate as far as it goes, but Matthew reproduces a bit more of the original, quoting directly from his inspired memory of the event.
Or it may be that after Jesus completed his public address, the Twelve asked him some follow-up questions in private and elicited this additional caveat. Indeed, we know from other accounts that the Twelve often quizzed their Lord in private when a provocative public utterance of his confounded their understanding and expectations. In that event, the exemptive clause is a parenthetical gloss.
As to the Pauline expansion, it may well be that the words of Christ ought to be taken in the tradition of proverbial wisdom, where you have a statement that is formally universal, but understood to be a generality that admits a number of individual exceptions. Many well-meaning Christians have been misled by failing to make allowance for the hyperbolic element of the proverbial genre.
The next question is what the “Pauline privilege” amounts to. It is usually assumed to allow the innocent party the right of divorce and remarriage.
But beyond that is the question of whether abandonment alone is a grounds for divorce, or only in the case of an unbeliever leaving a believer. Is the unbelieving status of the deserter a necessary condition of a valid divorce, or is desertion alone a sufficient condition?
The prima facie reason that Paul discusses marriage and divorce in relation to believers and unbelievers is because that is how the question was posed, and it was so posed because that was the situation within the Corinthian church.
But it does not necessarily follow that the spiritual status of the deserter is a separate condition. Rather, this may be a special application of a general principle, occasioned by the circumstances of the Corinthian church.
Indeed, it is hard to see the moral relevance of deserter’s state of grace, or the absence thereof. The question is whether a marriage remains a real marriage without cohabitation. Marriage is a covenant with bilateral duties. Each party must uphold its end of the bargain.
A practical problem with making the spiritual status of the deserter a condition of divorce is that it puts the burden on a second party to establish that the deserter is a genuine unbeliever or nominal believer rather than, say, a backslidden believer. But no human authority has x-ray vision into the regenerate, unregenerate, elect, or reprobate state of another human being. It is difficult to see how the onus could ever be discharged.
Desertion, with no prospect of reconciliation, is easy to establish, for it depends on physical abandonment and an unwillingness to return and resume marital relations. And infidelity is often easy to establish. These conditions rest on evidence in the public domain, and can therefore be met with a reasonable degree of certainty, but whether or not the deserter is a believer or unbeliever is a condition whose satisfaction is well-nigh unverifiable.
At most, one would have to form a practical judgment based on outward conduct. And this is a legitimate basis of church discipline. If the subject acts like an unbeliever, he is treated as though he were an unbeliever, whether or not he really is. But although this is a valid distinction, it succeeds by blurring the original distinction between believer and unbeliever. In that event, extended abandonment, without prospect of reconciliation, remains a valid ground for divorce.
It is possible that there are other valid conditions for a divorce, such as battery, or premarital misrepresentations. A contract is ordinarily invalid if either party enters under false pretenses.
But we must be very guarded lest we stretch an essentially strict and conservative position into an open-ended divorce policy. Remember the shock-value of our Lord’s prohibition, where he took a position to the right of both rabbinical schools, and admitted that his position was so inflexible that some would be better advised to forgo marriage altogether.
Have you read Wayne Grudem’s article he wrote on his change of position on the permissible reasons for divorce? I think he delivered it at ETS in 2019. I’m curious if you’ll cover it at any point.
This is largely aligned with where our elders have landed, after going deep on this as a group. Curious if you dove in on Malachi 2:16 and the use of the word, "hate" there? Interested to read what you come up with on "porneia" as well (that one is tough). Thanks for your work on this!
I have to a degree. But I probably won't spend as much time on the specific textual/linguistic problems of this passage in the near future. Maybe I'll write that down for an article down the road!
Thank you for writing this well-researched article. This book really helped me with this topic:
https://www.ccwtoday.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/DR-book.pdf
Thanks for sharing the link!
Thank you for this. For additional remarks that may in fact comport with most of what is said here, see my https://inchristus.com/2015/05/15/what-does-the-bible-really-say-about-divorce-remarriage/.
Thanks, Paul!
Thanks for an excellent post! I found this helpful too:
4. Divorce
Traditionally, there are two grounds for divorce: infidelity (Mt 5:32; 19:19) and desertion (1 Cor 7:15). One preliminary question is why the Matthew version, with its exemptive clause, is more liberal than the Markan version (10:11-12), on the one hand, but less liberal than the Pauline discussion, which “adds” a second ground?
Of course, any answer is bound to be somewhat conjectural, but the following may be suggested. It may be that Mark took adultery for granted, since that was assumed on all side (both Jewish & Greco-Roman) as a valid ground for divorce, whereas Matthew, in order to avoid future confusion, spells out the exception.
Or it may simply be that Matthew knew more than Mark. Mark had heard of the teaching of Jesus, but Matthew had heard the teaching of Jesus. Mark’s citation is accurate as far as it goes, but Matthew reproduces a bit more of the original, quoting directly from his inspired memory of the event.
Or it may be that after Jesus completed his public address, the Twelve asked him some follow-up questions in private and elicited this additional caveat. Indeed, we know from other accounts that the Twelve often quizzed their Lord in private when a provocative public utterance of his confounded their understanding and expectations. In that event, the exemptive clause is a parenthetical gloss.
As to the Pauline expansion, it may well be that the words of Christ ought to be taken in the tradition of proverbial wisdom, where you have a statement that is formally universal, but understood to be a generality that admits a number of individual exceptions. Many well-meaning Christians have been misled by failing to make allowance for the hyperbolic element of the proverbial genre.
The next question is what the “Pauline privilege” amounts to. It is usually assumed to allow the innocent party the right of divorce and remarriage.
But beyond that is the question of whether abandonment alone is a grounds for divorce, or only in the case of an unbeliever leaving a believer. Is the unbelieving status of the deserter a necessary condition of a valid divorce, or is desertion alone a sufficient condition?
The prima facie reason that Paul discusses marriage and divorce in relation to believers and unbelievers is because that is how the question was posed, and it was so posed because that was the situation within the Corinthian church.
But it does not necessarily follow that the spiritual status of the deserter is a separate condition. Rather, this may be a special application of a general principle, occasioned by the circumstances of the Corinthian church.
Indeed, it is hard to see the moral relevance of deserter’s state of grace, or the absence thereof. The question is whether a marriage remains a real marriage without cohabitation. Marriage is a covenant with bilateral duties. Each party must uphold its end of the bargain.
A practical problem with making the spiritual status of the deserter a condition of divorce is that it puts the burden on a second party to establish that the deserter is a genuine unbeliever or nominal believer rather than, say, a backslidden believer. But no human authority has x-ray vision into the regenerate, unregenerate, elect, or reprobate state of another human being. It is difficult to see how the onus could ever be discharged.
Desertion, with no prospect of reconciliation, is easy to establish, for it depends on physical abandonment and an unwillingness to return and resume marital relations. And infidelity is often easy to establish. These conditions rest on evidence in the public domain, and can therefore be met with a reasonable degree of certainty, but whether or not the deserter is a believer or unbeliever is a condition whose satisfaction is well-nigh unverifiable.
At most, one would have to form a practical judgment based on outward conduct. And this is a legitimate basis of church discipline. If the subject acts like an unbeliever, he is treated as though he were an unbeliever, whether or not he really is. But although this is a valid distinction, it succeeds by blurring the original distinction between believer and unbeliever. In that event, extended abandonment, without prospect of reconciliation, remains a valid ground for divorce.
It is possible that there are other valid conditions for a divorce, such as battery, or premarital misrepresentations. A contract is ordinarily invalid if either party enters under false pretenses.
But we must be very guarded lest we stretch an essentially strict and conservative position into an open-ended divorce policy. Remember the shock-value of our Lord’s prohibition, where he took a position to the right of both rabbinical schools, and admitted that his position was so inflexible that some would be better advised to forgo marriage altogether.
http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2004/07/too-hot-to-handle-2.html
Thank you for sharing this with me!
In the first line under "Old Testament Passages on Divorce", please change "immortality". 😁 It shook me.
Also in third paragraph under "Matthew 19:12: Jesus and His Teaching on Eunuchs", please correct "ook"
Ha. I have made both of those corrections. Yes, sexual immortality is not sexual immorality!
Have you read Wayne Grudem’s article he wrote on his change of position on the permissible reasons for divorce? I think he delivered it at ETS in 2019. I’m curious if you’ll cover it at any point.
I haven't! But I plan to read his 2021 Crossway book, which I would assume includes his change of position. I'll report back if it's interesting!